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Consciousness, brains and the replica problem
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Although the conscious state is considered an emergent property of the underlying brain activity
and thus somehow resides on brain hardware, there is a non-univocal mapping between both. Given
a neural hardware, multiple conscious patterns are consisten with it. Here we show, by means of a
simple gedankenexperiment that this has an importan logic consequence: any scenario involving the
transient shutdown of brain activity leads to the irreversible death of the conscious experience. In
a fundamental way, unless the continuous stream of consciousness is guaranteed, the previous self
vanishes and is replaced by a new one.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of consciousness has become a hot topic
of scientific enquiry over the last two decades (Searle,
2000, Crick and Koch, 1995, 2003). But in spite of this
increasing attention from the neurosciences, old ques-
tions remain open and the phenomenon itself differs from
other biological phenomena in that it is a subjective, first-
person ontology (Searle, 2000). Such special status gen-
erates a number of nontrivial questions, some of them
right in the boundaries between science and philosophy.
Most neuroscientists, with few exceptions, would agree
(even with different perspectives) that consciousness is a
self-organized, emergent property of brain activity and
neuronal wiring, although the nature and organization
of the brain-mind mapping is largely unknown (Locke,
1995; Dennett, 1991; Hesslow, 1994; Svenson, 1994; von
Wright, 1994; Crick and Koch, 2003). Multiple ques-
tions emerge from the previous scenarios, including the
nature of the new consciousness emerging after recovery
from long-term cryogenization or technological replace-
ment (Moravec, 1988; Egan, 1994; Minsky 1994). Simi-
lar problems arise in different contexts, such as telepor-
tation (Penrose, 1989). How can a transient shutdown
of brain activity affect the conscious experience? All the
previous situations inhabit the realm of speculation and
might never be achieved. The potential implications are
mostly a matter of philosophical speculation. There is,
however, an experimentally feasible scenario where no
such speculation is at work.
Recently, advances in suspended animation suggest the
possibility of preserving human life in a reversible state
where completely halted or deeply slowed cellular activ-
ity would be possible (Alam et al., 2005). Such state
has been obtained experimentally using different organ-
isms (Nystul and Roth, 2004; Blackston et al., 2005) and
nothing prevents to reach similar results using humans.
In fact, evidence from accidental, long-term suspended
animation is available from a number of case studies. In
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these cases, humans experiencing severe hpothermia over
several hours and showing lack of any vital sign (no pulse
nor brain activity) were able to recover without any long-
term complications. Ongoing research on using profound
hypothermia, together with appropriate organ preserva-
tion fluids confirm that such reversible states can be in-
duced in a repeatable manner (Alam et al., 2005). The
method, used in swine animal models, results in clini-
cal brain death, but none of the surviving hypothermic
animals displayed detectable neurological deficits or cog-
nitive impairment.
How can a shutdown of brain activity alter the nature
of the self-conscious experience? In principle, you might
think that your consciousness is temporally stopped, just
to be back afterwards. In other words, you and your con-
sciousness weak up altogether. Is that really the case? To
put the question in a more specific form, we consider a
mental (Gedanken) experiment, which we will call the
replica problem. Below we show, using a logic argument,
that something much more fundamental is at work when
considering scenarios involving consciousness and its rela-
tion to hardware. Together with brain death (no matter
if permanent of transient) the death of subjective con-
sciousness needs to be considered.
II. THE REPLICA PROBLEM
The following experiment is an imaginary one, not ex-
pected to be ever possible. It is thus a Gedankenexperi-
ment, used as a logic argument to show the unexpected
consequences of the one-to-many brain-mind mapping. It
is important to stress that this is a thought experiment
and is thus not expected to be possible. In this con-
text, we are aware that quantum mechanics forbids the
realization of the ideal experiment to be described below
(Scarani et al., 2005) but that is not relevant to our dis-
cussion, particularly because quantum effects should not
be expected to have a real relevance in large scale neural
dynamics. However, although the special case considered
here would require a high-level technology not available
today, some equivalent scenarios (such as the induction
of profound hypothermia discussed above) are likely to
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FIG. 1: (a) The extended replica problem, as defined in the text. Here we start with an individual defined as the brain-mind
pair {A,C}. A copy of the brain hardware is made, with no activity and thus no consciousness, here indicated as {A′, φc}.
Since the new physical hardware is an exact copy, no experiment would be able to distinguish between A and A′. If activated
(dashed line, lower right) the copied system would obviously display a separated conscious experience, here indicated as C′.
If the A’s brain is extracted and replaced by A′, we would have exactly the same hardware (so effectively A = A′) and no
difference would be measurable. However, once activated again, it would not exhibit the initial subjective conscious experience,
but a different one. The previous experiment is equivalent to the situation shown in (b) where we simply shut down brain
activity and afterwards reverse the unconscious state into a conscious one.
be soon applied to human beings.
Let us take a given individual brain A, experiencing
a given (self-)conscious activity. We can indicate that
the conscious experience C is somehow generated by this
brain A using a mapping:
A −→ C (1)
Where C must be interpreted as an emergent property
of brain activity and involves both subjectivity and self-
awareness. Let us now imagine that thanks to a very
advanced technology a full copy of A can be obtained
instantaneously at t = t0. Considering instantaneous
formation is not strictly necessary, but makes the argu-
ment simpler, since it liberates us from considering the
further divergence of the two replicated systems. Let us
call this new brain hardware A′. This replica, if active,
would generate a different conscious experience, which
we indicate as C′. Clearly we have now:
A′ −→ C′ (2)
the important point here is that, although exactly the
same hardware is being used, we have C 6= C′ (differ-
ent subjective conscious experiences). This is true in
spite that no single experiment made by some external
observer would be able (at t = t0) to distinguish be-
tween A and A′. The existence of a replica of A gener-
ates a somewhat strange situation, since clearly indicates
that brain activity does not univocally define conscious-
ness. This is what we name the replica problem. This
problem has been explored by a number of authors (see
http://www.benbest.com/philo/doubles.html) and is our
starting point.
Let us now consider A, with an associated conscious
experience C. The brain-mind pair {A,C} thus fully de-
fines the individual. Let us assume that brain activity
is stopped through some process S. If no brain activity
is present, no conscious experience exists. The individ-
ual’s brain is dead, and will be indicated as φc, meaning
’no consciousness’ (here the symbol φc indicates lack of
consciousness, without explicit reference to a given C).
Now let us imagine that the brain is reactivated through
some other process R. The standard view considers the
following causal set of events:
{A,C}
S
−→ {A, φc}
R
−→ {A,C} (3)
This logical chain of events corresponds to a common
reasoning: my brain is freezed and stops working, but
once a reverse process is used, brain activity returns and
I wake up. Is that a correct answer? Which consciousness
is experienced: the previous one (C) or a new one (C′)?
As shown below, a new consciousness is effectively at
work, i. e. the correct sequence is in fact:
{A,C}
S
−→ {A, φc}
R
−→ {A,C′} (4)
and thus, in terms of consciousness, we never “wake up”.
The reason is that the hardware does not univocally de-
fine the conscious experience, and thus there is no reason
why the conscious activity emerging after recovering the
stopped brain would be the same. However, you might
argue that it is the same brain what is at work, and
thus cannot be properly related with the replica prob-
lem, where two identical, but different brains are being
used.
3An additional experiment allows to better understand
the implications of the replica problem. This extended
replica problem can be used to see clearly why the new
conscious experience is necessarily a different one. The
basic steps to be described below are summarized in fig-
ure 1.
III. THE EXTENDED REPLICA PROBLEM
We now describe a special mental experiment involv-
ing the formation of a replica. In figure 1, individuals
involving an active (and thus conscious) brain are indi-
cated as framed black circles. If brain activity is stopped,
the non-conscious state is indicated as an empty circle.
If no brain is present, an empty box is shown.
Let us assume that we start with {A,C} and we make
a material (but not active) copy A′ of the initial brain.
We have a new brain-mind system {A′, φc} with no con-
sciouss activity (φc) and physically separated from the
initial one (see upper part of figure 1a). If activated, A′s
brain would generate its own subjective conscious state,
i. e.
{A′,¬C}
R
−→ {A′, C′} (5)
with C′ obviously different from C (lower right, fig. 1a).
Now we shut down the activity of A i.e.
{A,C}
S
−→ {A, φc} (6)
And now let us replace A by A′, i. e.
{A, φc} → {A
′, φc} (7)
Since the two brains are physically identical, no measure-
ment would be able to detect any difference between the
previous and the new hardware, and thus we have the
equivalence:
{A, φc} ≡ {A
′, φc} (8)
The logic implication is that they can be exchanged by
each other (and any other exact copy) and would not be
distinguished. But it is know obvious that the implanted
brain, though identical, is not going to maintain the sub-
jective conscious experience that we had at the beginning:
it was a copy and following the previous implications we
would have
{A, φc}
R
−→ {A,C′} (9)
The sequence of events described above is logically equiv-
alent to starting from {A,C}, stopping A from being ac-
tive and restoring its function (ending up in {A,C′}, as
indicated in figure 1b. This completes our argument. To
summarize: any process that either stops brain activity
(and thus leaves us with a “just hardware” individual)
or replaces a given brain structure by a completely new
one (after stopping consciousness in its previous physical
support) leads to a state of “dead consciousness”. As a
consequence of the non-unique mapping between brain
structure and conscioussness, death of a given conscious
experience will be irreversible.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have seen how the one-to-many map-
ping between brain and mind implies that any scenario
involving transient brain death leads to the death of con-
sciousness, as defined by a subjective, first-person ontol-
ogy. The subjective nature of the self makes brain trans-
fer and teleportation non-viable in terms of a reliable way
of transfering the self to the new individual. These are,
however, science fiction scenarios. However, as shown
above, the same situation must be applied to surgery in-
volving profound hypothermia: you (meaning your self)
would never truly wake up once the normal brain func-
tion is recovered again. Someone else will, with exactly
the same external features and memories as you, but ex-
periencing a different consciousness. Under this view, no
true immortality (the immortal nature of your self) is
possible.
Although future technology might allow building a
copy of our brains and make our memories and feelings
survive, something will be inevitably lost. The argument
provided here suggests that the “self” persists (it is alive)
provided that the stream of consciousness flows in a con-
tinuous manner and is never interrupted. If it is, death of
the self occurs in a non-reversible manner. This seems to
provide an interesting twist to the mind-body problem.
Although the argument presented here is a logical one,
further extensions of this study would involve brain states
not necessarily associated to a complete lack of activity.
More quantitative analyses could be made, involving dif-
ferent features of consciousness (Seth et al., 2006) and the
possible localization of the conscious self-representation
(Lou et al., 2004 and references therein). In this context,
further questions arise: What are the minimum require-
ments in terms of brain activity able to sustain a con-
scious pattern? Are there partial changes inducing a loss
of self-awareness related to our previous discussion?
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